Project Description
Today's PKIs suffer from many severe problems - CA compromises can affect any site in the Internet due to their almost unrestricted global authority, most users cannot competently assess the trustworthiness of CAs without restricting access to many HTTPS sites, and revocation of certificates and misbehaving CAs is difficult and ineffective. Our research focuses on addressing these problems through a variety of approaches. We build on log-based PKI proposals such as Sovereign Keys and Certificate Transparency, using public, append-only logs to monitor CA behavior and ensure that certificates are issued according to domain-specified policies. We also leverage public logs to handle revocations and key updates in response to events such as key loss or compromise. On a larger scale, we are redesigning the global PKI infrastructure for routing, naming, and end-entity certification (such as TLS) to further restrict global CA authority without hindering access to HTTPS sites worldwide.
Publications
12 results
2022
2020
2018
2016
Design, Analysis, and Implementation of ARPKI: an Attack-Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure.
Basin, David, Cremers, Cas, Kim, Tiffany Hyun-Jin, Perrig, Adrian, Sasse, Ralf, and Szalachowski, Pawel.
In IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing (TDSC) 2016.
Research Area: Public Key Infrastructures
RITM: Revocation in the Middle.
Pawel Szalachowski, Laurent Chuat, Taeho Lee, and Adrian Perrig.
In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS) 2016. (Best Paper Award)
Research Area: Public Key Infrastructures
PKI Safety Net (PKISN): Addressing the Too-Big-to-Be-Revoked Problem of the TLS Ecosystem.
Pawel Szalachowski, Laurent Chuat, and Adrian Perrig.
In Proceedings of the IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Euro S&P) 2016.
Research Area: Public Key Infrastructures
2015
2014
PoliCert: Secure and Flexible TLS Certificate Management.
Szalachowski, Pawel, Matsumoto, Stephanos, and Perrig, Adrian.
In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) 2014.
Research Area: Public Key Infrastructures
ARPKI: Attack Resilient Public-Key Infrastructure.
Basin, David, Cremers, Cas, Kim, Tiffany Hyun-Jin, Perrig, Adrian, Sasse, Ralf, and Szalachowski, Pawel.
In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) 2014.
Research Area: Public Key Infrastructures
2013